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COMMENTS ON
"AFTER LEGAL AID IS ABOLISHED"
BY GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
Frank Rosiny*

Geoff and I agree that "We ought to be much more serious about
legal aid for the poor." There is-to borrow Geoff s phrase-"greater
urgency to ... make procedural justice a reality"; but not for the reasons
Geoff has advanced.
The urgency derives from an ever-increasing awareness of the
widening gulf between those whom our society has blessed with its
abundance and those who have too little.
Think of it... as Roy just mentioned.., yesterday, the Dow closed
above 9,000. For the first time in recent memory, the federal government is projecting a surplus. Yet, 13% of our population continues to live
in seemingly intractable poverty. And, still, we cannot find the price of
two B-1 bombers to provide them with adequate legal services.
Geoff s initial reference to Brown v. Board of Ed. struck a responsive chord because I was in the South shortly after that case had been
decided, and I know first hand how far we had to go in order to secure in
practice the theoretical rights announced by the Court.
It took many years ... years which saw much violence, pain and
courage ... to realize those ideals ... and the job is not yet done. You

may recall some young men from this area who gave their lives in Mississippi for those ideals-that was 10 years after Brown v. Board of Ed.
They were also years in which the lower courts-both state and federal-were repeatedly asked to fill in the gaps left by the Supreme
Court's pronouncements... or to translate those constitutional principles
into concrete results at the local level-the level where all of us live.
Without that kind of local implementation, the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Ed. could have remained as meaningless
as the assurances of personal freedom in the Soviet Constitution.
It is essential to the proper functioning of our democratic system
that the poor and disadvantaged have meaningful access to the courts in
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order to prevent the abridgement of their constitutionally ordained rights
by the elected representatives of the so-called "silent majority." Without
such meaningful access, those rights will exist only in theory... and, for
all practical purposes, may in time cease to exist.
We know that there are lawyers among us who will always step
forward and volunteer to carry the fight pro bono publico. But, because
the fight is truly pro bono publico, in fairness, and consistent with our
democratic ideals, public funds should be made available to them.
Not all injustice makes it to the editorial pages of The New York
Times. Not every case is Brown v. Board of Education. When an indigent
person is unfairly threatened with eviction, or Social Security benefits
are wrongly cut. . . when he or she can't get adequate medical attention
there is a quiet injustice that few will ever hear about. And unless
...
we have put in place appropriate mechanisms to address that kind of
injustice, we fail as a nation.
By way of illustration, the Social Security laws are very complex.
Few private lawyers can afford to take the time to study those laws. Even
fewer are equipped to handle the thousands of individual cases seeking
restoration of benefits improperly denied. Without such lawyers-supported today by a pittance of public funding-there would be absolutely
no check on the excesses of a faceless administrative agency bent on
producing a particular bottom line result.
No matter how we may deplore the litigiousness.., the downright
adversariness. . . which has infected our society, litigation still provides
the most effective check on the abuses of an indifferent bureaucracy...
or, worse yet, on those agencies which have been co-opted by the very
industries and interests which they are intended to regulate.
Geoff s praise for European administrative agencies and civil law
judges-with their power to dispense "law that is ... legally [or substantively] correct"-is misplaced ... and particularly inappropriate in
light of the present debate surrounding legal services. It is even more
disturbing to find such praise a recurrent theme of this conference.
In stark contrast to the independence of our judiciary, with its
proven ability to check the excesses of an abusive government, the
inquisitorial judges of civil law systems have time and again demonstrated a disappointing tendency to be co-opted by the prevailing party
line and have too easily come to function as an arm of executive policy.
The system which Geoff today holds up as a model gave history the
same courts that convicted Emile Zola of libel and sentenced him to a
year in prison for having written an article protesting the unjust conviction of Alfred Dreyfus. Have we forgotten so quickly the Moscow show
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trials of the 1930's or the civil law judges who spit out their venom on
the hapless victims of Nazi oppression?
To characterize such abominations as the excesses of what Geoff
refers to as "bad states" is too facile. It ignores the extent to which the
judicial infrastructure failed to prevent-or actually abetted-the conditions which made these states "bad."
I submit that, in America, we can have both-due process and legal
correctness-but without meaningful access to the courts, we will have
neither.
Also troubling is Geoff' s statement that "public subvention of partisan advocacy contradicts a principle of democratic equality." Rather, I
would say that partisan advocacy might have that effect where, for example, it achieves more than the constitution or the laws of the land are
intended to secure for its clients. But where such advocacy does no more
than secure for its clients that to which they are lawfully entitled, there is
no contradiction. The principle of equality before the law requires that
the rights of all-rich and poor-be protected. The protection of those
rights does not "contradict a principle of democratic equality," it defines
the very essence of our democracy and its assurance of equality before
the law.
Geoff says that "the concept is that participation [in legal disputation-or litigation] will, of its own force, yield satisfactory dispositions-that is, dispositions whose content will not require further
examination by anyone in a position of responsibility." However, that is
not "the concept" and-as our recent experience with the LSC litigation
demonstrates-such a concept does not reflect the way our system
works.
The current unhappy mess in Legal Services began with Congress
serving up the 1996 Budget Act. That Act and the interim LSC regulations which it spawned were contested in the courts, which provided
some measure of relief. The LSC then created new regulations to implement the Budget Act in a way which it purports to be in conformity with
the judiciary's interpretation of the Constitution's mandate. Once again
(albeit without immediate success), those regulations were attacked in
the courts. So it is that the process continues to swing from Congress to
the courts ... to the agency ... back to the courts ... and, most assuredly, it will go back to Congress.
Advocacy is not all good or all bad. There is good advocacy and bad
advocacy. There are worthy causes and unworthy causes. And, certainly,
effective advocacy does not always produce the best judgment or fairest
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result. But, the process is rarely ever at rest and is subject to continual
reexamination.
Geoff s historical review of legal aid in terms of supply and demand
neatly sets the stage for what seems to be a kind of zero-based budgetary
analysis of what would happen if public funds were suddenly denied.
However, given the exigencies which presently beset the Legal
Services Corporation, rather than accept Geoff s challenge to engage in a
kind of zero-based budgetary analysis of public subvention for legal aid,
perhaps, we should begin to think in terms of striking a better balance.
In the present context, few of the contestants are searching for compromise or common ground.
But, as people of good will, we know that all conflict should be
resolved, and as good lawyers, we ought to be able to find the means to
do it.
The greatness of our society.., the hope and promise of our nation
.. . lies in the mix of private and public institutions. No one sidewhether public or private... no single branch of government-whether
legislative, executive or judicial.., can be depended on to the exclusion
of all others.
Neither side of the debate has all the answers. Neither side owns
the truth. But both must begin to work toward a solution ... if we are to
advance as a civilization worthy of the name... if we are to move closer
to our democratic ideal of social justice.
History teaches us that the processes of our government are cyclic
and pendular. Extremism begets extremism... but, in time, because we
are a free and open society, protected by an independent judiciary and
bar, moderation will one day prevail.
Let us work to speed the coming of that day by thinking in terms of
how each interest can accommodate the legitimate concerns of the other.

